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Philosophy of Education is a discipline that arose historically in the context of the 
endeavor to turn education into an object of scientific, rigorous knowledge. The main 
question that it should address is thus not “What is philosophy?” but rather, “What is 
education?” When the start is the first question, the discourse tends to focus too narrowly in 
on itself, on the problems of philosophers. The second question was the starting point for 
the movement that has done the most to consolidate this form of knowledge: the school 
promoted by R.S. Peters and his followers. 
The first question often leads Philosophy of Education down a rabbit-hole by 
acknowledging the impossibility of ever finding a final and definitive fundament that gives 
meaning to education, an activity replete with contingency. The perception of this apparent 
failure may give rise to two equally unappealing ways out for education. One is to hide 
behind the alleged neutrality of a technological discourse that pushes aside any questions on 
the aims of education. The other way out is to retreat into a total skepticism from which any 
educational intent becomes suspect. 
Especially at a time when the predominating discourse is that of performativity, there 
needs to be a return to education itself, in a kind of phenomenological U-turn. At this turn, 
education is discovered to be a form of relating with the other and with others. In contrast 
to the Herbartian attempt of constructing the pedagogical knowledge over the idea of a 
general aim of education, Dilthey stated that “die Wissenschaft der Pädagogik ... nur 
beginnen mit der Deskription des Erziehers in seinem Verhältnis zum Zögling” [“the 
science of pedagogy … only begins with the description of educators in their relationships 
with the pupil”] (W. Dilthey: Grundlinien eines Systems der Pädagogik, 1884-1894).  
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Education is a peculiar relationship of mediation between object and subject. It consists 
in projecting the world for the learner, but it is the latter, not the former, who defines the 
center of attention. This is why someone can be an excellent chemist or musician and yet be 
a complete failure as a chemistry or music educator. For a musician, the most important 
thing is, as it should be, the performance of the musical piece (the object). When that 
musician acts with educational purpose, the point of interest shifts, or should shift. Music 
education takes on meaning insofar as it in some way involves an increase in value in the 
person being taught (the subject), even if that means having to do without the exactness of 
artistic performance. 
The contingent nature of the criteria on the increasing in value must not turn into a 
paralyzing condition. John Dewey said that Philosophy of Education “means the necessity 
of the introduction of a new order of conceptions leading to new modes of practice” (J. 
Dewey: Experience and Education, 1938). Philosophy of Education helps to see education 
as a deep, multi-dimensional reality, historical and ideological, not to delight in its 
contemplation, or in its negation, but rather to shed light on action. There is no possibility 
of delay when the starting question is education. The urgency of the task of educating 
obliges us to deal with uncertainty head-on, to acknowledge that “we should not look for 
skyhooks, but only for toeholds” (R. Rorty: Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, 1991). 
 
